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A first  step in  the  discussion  of policy  toward corporations  in farming
is  to recognize  the existence  of at least three  types of farming corporations:
1.  The  closely  held  family  (or  sometimes  one-man)  corporation,  en-
gaged  primarily  in  farming.
2.  Closely  held,  often  family-type,  corporations  combining  a  farming
enterprise  with  some  other  business  activity,  which  may  be  either
(a)  related  to  agriculture  or  (b)  unconnected  with  farming.
3.  Publicly  traded  corporations,  typically  involved  in farm  production
and  in  an  agricultural  supply  or  processing  activity,  but  in  a  few
cases  organized  explicitly  to  engage  primarily  in farming.
Recent  studies  by  the  U.S.  Department  of  Agriculture  have  identified
a total  of  11,500  corporations  engaged  in farming  in  47  states  (excluding
California,  Alaska,  and  Hawaii,  for  which  data  are  as  yet  unpublished).
The total for the  50 states  is expected to reach  14,000,  or about  1 percent
of  all  commercial  farms  and  ranches.
For  the  47  states,  68  percent  of all  corporate farms  and  ranches were
family  corporations,  sometimes  involving  farming  with  some  other  busi-
ness activity.  Some  12 percent  were one-man corporations,  and 20 percent
had  diversified  ownership.  Less  than  100  corporations  producing  farm
products  had  their  capital  stock  listed  and  traded  on  organized  stock
exchanges.  In  total,  corporate  farms  operated  an  estimated  7  percent  of
the  land  in  farms  and  accounted  for approximately  9  percent  of the  gross
value of  farm  products  sold  in  1967.
These  percentages  are relatively  small for  U.S.  agriculture  as  a whole,
but they  are  large  for  specific  products  and  in a  few  states.  Corporations
accounted  for  31  percent  of  all  land  in  commercial  farms  and  ranches
in  Florida,  28  percent  in  Utah,  22  percent  in  Nevada,  and  from  11  to
17 percent in the remaining Mountain  states,  and in Massachusetts,  Rhode
Island,  and  Connecticut.  Among  products,  corporation  farms  were  espe-
cially  prominent  producers  of  poultry  products,  fruits,  vegetables,  and
beef cattle.
Over  half  of  all  existing  farming  corporations  have  been  established
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corporations,  the  period  since  1960  has  also  seen  the  appearance  of  two
types  of  farming  corporations  that  are  new  on  the American  scene:  the
relatively  large corporation  engaged  explicitly  in farmland  clearing,  drain-
age,  and  improvement  (especially  prominent  in  the  Atlantic  Coastal  and
Mississippi  Delta states)  and the large  conglomerate corporation  branching
out  into  agriculture.  Although  few  in  number,  it  is  this  latter  type  of
corporation  in  farming  that  gives  rise  to  much  of  the  current  concern.
Much  of  the  concern  about  farming  corporations  is  at root  a  concern
about  bigness  in  farming.  Many  of  the  big  farms  in  America  are  not
incorporated.  If  attention  is  confined  strictly  to  corporations  in  farming,
an  important aspect  of the issue  will be  neglected.
CLIMATE  OF  OPINION
Public  and professional  opinion  regarding  food  surpluses  and famine
threats  has  swung through  a  wide  arc  in recent  years.  Concern  with  agri-
cultural  surpluses  in  the  late  1950's  and  early  1960's  shifted  to  fears  of
an  impending  world-wide  shortage  of  food  in  the  mid-1960's.  We  are
now well  away  from this peak  in the  belief  in an  impending  food shortage,
and  surplus  threats  are  again  worrisome.
If  nonfarm  investors  have  channeled  capital  into  agriculture  because
they  expect  world  population  growth  to  generate  food  shortages  and
higher  prices,  they  are  almost  surely  going  to  be  disappointed.  Yet  it
seems  probable  that a part of  the  interest  of nonfarm  investors  in farming
corporations  during  the  mid-1960's  grew  out  of  a  belief  in farming  as  a
"growth  industry,"  based  on  a  neo-Malthusian  view  of  impending  world
food  shortages.
This  belief  has  been  strongly  reinforced  by  inflationary  trends  in  the
economy,  and  especially  by  rising  land  values.  Farmland  values  have
increased  almost  without  interruption  for  thirty-five  years.  This  is  the
longest  period  of  sustained  land  value  increase  in  our  national  history.
Nationally,  the  index  of  farmland  prices  (1957-59 =  100)  rose  from  30
in  1940  to  111  in  1960,  and to  176  in  1969.
The  conclusion  is  inescapable  that  an  anticipation  of  continuing  land
value  increases  is  being  built  into  expected  returns  from  farming.  The
majority  of  the  U.S.  population  has  never  known  anything  except  rising
land  values.  It  is  difficult  to  document  the  impact  of  this  expectation
on  corporate  decisions  to  engage  in  farming,  but  the  impact  has  clearly
been  great.
This  inflationary  trend  has  unquestionably  played  a  major  role  in
determining  the  climate  of  expectations  with  which  prospective  investors
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that  current  annual  returns  could  be  quite  modest  or  even  zero,  while
leaving  intact  the  promise  of  long-term  capital  gains.
INCENTIVES  FOR  FARM  INCORPORATION
A  Missouri  study  of  family  farm corporations  in  1968  reported  that
50  percent  of  the  families  incorporated  to  facilitate  farm  transfer  and
estate  management,  30 percent  for  tax  considerations,  and  16  percent  to
limit  liability.  Improved  access  to  credit  was  cited  as  a  reason  in only  a
few  cases.  These  percentages  are  similar  to  those  found  in  a  Minnesota
study  in  1958  and  confirmed  in  a  repeat  study  in  1968.  For  family  farm
corporations,  estate planning motives  dominated.  For closely  held  corpora-
tions  combining  farming  with  a  nonfarm  business  activity,  the  primary
goal  of  incorporation  was  usually  to  separate  the  assets  of  the  principal
stockholder's  various  enterprises,  rather than to  raise capital  by persuading
others  to  share  as  investors,  although  there  were  instances  of  the  latter.
For  nonfamily  corporate  farming  firms,  the  motives  for  incorporation
are more  complex,  including  continuity of  operation,  limitation of liability,
mobilization  of  capital,  attraction  of  superior  managerial  talent,  and  tax
advantages.  For the  large firm, the  mobilization  of capital may be  virtually
impossible  without  use  of  the  corporate  device  to  limit  liability.  It  is
important  to  note,  however,  that  many  large  farming  enterprises  are  not
incorporated.  In  a current  survey  of  some  50  large  farms  in the  Midwest
of  over  2,000  acres  in size,  incorporated  farms  were  a  distinct  minority.
This  suggests  that  the  focus  should  be  shifted  from  the  firm  to  the
individual  stockholder,  in  seeking  a  more  adequate  explanation  for  the
recent  interest  in  farming  corporations  by  nonfarm  investors.  Given  the
importance  of inflationary  trends  over the  past decade,  a history  of  rising
land  values  over  thirty-five  years,  and  a  tax  policy  that  favors  corporate
types  of  investment  for  high  tax-bracket  individuals,  it  should  not  be
surprising that there  has been  a recent expansion  of interest  in corporation
farming.
Corporate  investments  in  farm  real  estate  have  been  stimulated  in
the  past  two  decades  by  rapid  advances  in  agricultural  technology,  an
excellent  press which  has  given  wide  publicity  to  the  miracles  of  modern
agriculture,  and  by  the  growing  professionalization  of  management  in
agriculture.  A  part  of  the  explanation  for  the  growth  of  corporations
in  farming  must  be  credited  to  the  success  with  which  our  agricultural
training  institutions  have  combined  training  in  traditional  agricultural
sciences  with  the  more  recently  developed  techniques  of  modern  man-
agement.  Farm  managers  of  high  quality  are  available  for  hire.  But  this
is  still  only  a part  of the explanation.
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A  landowner  with  a  nonfarm  income,  or  an  investor  in  a  farming
corporation,  will usually  find  it  rewarding  to  convert  as  much of his  farm
income  as  possible  into  asset  values,  which  can  ultimately  be  taxed  at
the  capital  gains  tax rate.  Since  this  rate  never  exceeds  25  percent  of the
gains,  this opportunity  is  especially  attractive to individuals  in  high income
tax  brackets.
The  nature  of  the farm  business  makes  it  especially  attractive  for the
wealthy  investor.  Assets  eligible  for  capital  gains  tax  treatment  are  a
large  portion  of total  assets,  and  the bulk  of  his  investment  is represented
by the  most durable  asset  of  all-land.  The  classic  illustration is  the beef
cattle  ranch.  With  most  of  the  investment  in  land  and  a  breeding  herd,
opportunities  are  maximized  for  appreciation  in capital  value,  and  subse-
quent taxation  at not more than  25 percent  of the  gain.  Similar  attractions
characterize  orchards,  groves,  and  vineyards.
When there  are  a few  big farms  and  many family-type  farms,  a market
for  used  farm  equipment  develops.  This  expands  the  options  available
to large  or corporate  farms  in  taking full  advantage  of  rapid  depreciation
of  machinery  and  equipment  or  in  turning  it  over  every  two  years,  or
less.  Because  of  their  size  and  capital  position,  large  farms  can  make
greater  use  of  this  advantage  than  can  smaller  farms.  Incorporation  is
not  necessary  to  enjoy  this  advantage,  but  it  is  an  advantage  that  the
large corporate  farm can  utilize.
Expenditures  on  soil  and  water  conservation  and  related  improve-
ments  on  land  can be  deducted  as current  expenses  even  though  expendi-
tures  of  this  type  would  usually  be  depreciated  or  added  to  the  cost  of
the  land  in  determining  its  base  value.  Expenditures  on  soil  and  water
conservation  can be deducted up to 25  percent of gross income in any one
year,  and  carried  forward  to  succeeding  years  until  exhausted,  subject
to  the  25  percent  limitation  each  year.  In  effect,  the  whole  of  soil  and
water  conservation  expenses  can  be  deducted  from  gross  farm  income
over  time.  Deductions  for  expenditures  on  land  clearing  or  improvement
are limited  to $5,000  in  any one year or 25 per cent  of the taxable income
derived  from  farming  in  that  year,  whichever  is  smaller.  There  is  no
carry-over  provision.  Any  part  of  land  clearing  expenses  exceeding
$5,000  or 25 percent of taxable income in any one year must be capitalized
and added  to  the base  value of  the  land.  The  benefits  from  the deduction
of land clearing expenses  are of principal  value to those  who  have  taxable
income from farming of  $20,000 or  more in  any  one year.  This deduction
is  of little value  to a  small  farmer  with  a  low  taxable  income.
One  of  the  most  important  forces  that  has  stimulated  the  growth  of
large  and corporate  farms  is the  way  in which our  graduated,  progressive
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basis  instead  of  an  accrual  basis  for  accounting  is  convenient  for  the
small  or medium-size  farm,  but  of  very  little  value  in  terms  of  reduced
taxes.  It  is  of  monetary  value  to  the  large  farm,  ranch,  or orchard,  and
especially  to  the  very  large  nonoperating  owner.  Allowable  deductions
for  expenditures  on  soil  and  water  conservation  or  land  improvement
are  primarily useful  to farmers  with large incomes.  The taxation  of  capital
gains  at  not  more  than  25  percent  is  of  significant  value  only  for those
with  very  large  incomes.  A  bonus  for  bigness  has  been  unintentionally
built  into  our  tax  system.
POSSIBLE  CONSEQUENCES
Current  concern  about  the  accelerating  trend  toward  corporation
farming  is  due  in large  part  to the fact  that  some  of  the farms  are  larger
than  necessary  to  achieve  desirable  levels  of  efficiency  in  resource  use
in farming.  With the  exception  of  poultry  enterprises,  beef-cattle  feeding,
and some types  of orchard and vegetable  crop production,  research  studies
have  shown  that  virtually  all  two-man  farms  are  large  enough  to  achieve
most  of  the  production  economies  to  be  gained  from  size  of  firm.  With
the  exceptions  noted,  the  economic  argument  for  larger  farms  is  not  an
argument  for  larger-than-family-size  farms.  Why,  then,  is  there  concern
about  corporation  farms?  Primarily,  for three reasons:
1.  A  fear  that  many  of  the  incentives  leading  to  large  corporate
farms  are  not  connected  with  greater  efficiency  or  superior  man-
agement,  but  are  the  result  of  institutional  defects,  particularly  in
the  tax  system,  in  market  structures,  and  in  agricultural  extension
programs.
2.  A  fear  that  the  trend  toward  corporation  farming  is  reinforcing
a  trend toward  the  centralization  of  economic  power  and  decision
making  in a few hands  and places, with  a resultant  loss of flexibility
and  diversity  in our national  economic  life.
3.  A fear  that  a  rural  social  structure  dominated  by  a  small  number
of  "company  farms"  will  produce  a  deadening  conformity  and  a
restricted  environment  in  which  to  develop  the  full  potential  of
the quality  of  rural  life.
There  are  grounds  for  these  fears.  We  have  already  noted  examples
of  distorted  incentives  generated  by  the  tax  system.  Institutional  defects
that  favor  large  or  corporate  farms  are  also  apparent  in  the  agricultural
marketing  structure,  both  for  inputs  and  products.  Farmers  themselves
are  to  blame  for  some  of  this  weakness.  They  have  often  resisted  the
market  discipline  needed  to  make  them  competitive  with  large  farms  in
product  quality,  uniformity,  and  stability  of  supply.  Small  producers  can
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do  so,  the  small  producer  must  surrender  some  of  his  sovereignty  in
farm management  and marketing  decisions to his suppliers,  or to marketing
or  processing  agencies.  These  may  be  cooperatives,  or  private  businesses
operating  under  contractual  arrangements  with  the  farmer.  But  in  any
case they  must have  power to  impose production  and  marketing  standards
on their  farmer  members  or  contracting  partners.
A related  institutional  defect  concerns  the  increasingly  complex nature
of agricultural  technology  and  the  need for a greatly  expanded  agricultural
extension effort  if this  complex  technology  is  to be  made  effectively  avail-
able  to  all  farmers.
Much  of  the  effort  at  user  education  for  fertilizers,  feed  additives,
farm  chemicals,  and  animal  medicines  is  supported  by  private  industry.
It  is  understandable  that  suppliers  prefer  to  concentrate  their  sales  effort
on large-volume  users.  The costs  of user-education  programs  or  after-sales
service  rise  sharply  if  many  small  users  are  involved.  Agro-chemical
technology  can  be  divided  physically  into  small  doses,  but  the  technical
and  managerial  skills  needed  to  use  these  small  doses  effectively  are
often  beyond  the  reach  of  the  average  farmer.  If the  advantage  in  using
this  technology  seems  to  lie  with  the  large  farm,  it  may  be  a  measure
of  our  inadequacy  in  agricultural  extension  rather  than  an  example  of
true  economies  of  large-scale  production.
Smaller farms  have in many  cases  been written  off  as production  units
by  agricultural  specialists  and  technicians.  Their  operators  are  classed
as  a  welfare  problem,  not  an  agricultural  potential.  There  are  many
instances  of  productive  interaction  between  agricultural  scientists,  experi-
ment  station  staffs,  extension  workers,  and  the  operators  of  the  larger
commercial  farms.  It  is  more  difficult  to  find  instances  of  concerted
efforts  to  perfect  agricultural  technology  in  "small  packages,"  suited  for
use  on  the  nation's  smaller  farms.
The second  fear generated  by  the  rise of  corporation  farming  concerns
the  consequences  for  the  national  economy  of  concentration  in  agricul-
tural  production.  Our  existing  structure  of  agriculture  has  facilitated  the
transfer  to  consumers  of  the  benefits  of  cost-reducing  technology  in  agri-
culture.  It  seems  unlikely  that  the  benefits  to  consumers  of  agricultural
modernization  will  be  as  direct  or  as  significant  if  the  structure  of  agri-
culture  is  characterized  by  a  small  number  of  large  producing  firms.  We
know that large  firms in agriculture  must commit capital  in large  quantities
to  slow-maturing  production  processes.  Unless  the  firm  is  large  enough
to  control  markets  and  practice  a  form  of  internal  self-insurance  against
weather,  these  large  capital  investments  will  be  high-risk.  The  under-
standable  desire  for  risk  reduction  may  lead  to  a  degree  of  rigidity  that
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the  rapid  adoption  of  new  technology  is  thought  to  be  a  characteristic
of  the  large  firm.  This  may  not  be  true  if  only  large  firms  dominate  the
production  field.
In  the  past,  at  the  farm  level,  agricultural  products  have  largely
remained  undifferentiated.  There  have  been  almost  no  "brand  names"
that  carried  back  to  the producing  farms.  With  large  corporations  in  the
farming  business,  this  is  almost  sure  to  change.  We  can  already  see  the
development  of large-scale  expenditures  on advertising  campaigns  designed
to  create  the  illusion  of  differentiated  products  produced  by  large  farms.
If the  trend  toward bigness  in  agriculture  is  accompanied  by  increasingly
heavy  expenditures  on  nonfunctional  advertising,  it  will  be  the  consumer
who  pays.  In  this  sense,  it  is  not  only  farmers  but  also  consumers  who
have  a  direct  interest  in  the  trend  toward  corporation  farming.
For  many  people,  the  least  tangible  but  most  worrisome  aspect  of  a
trend toward corporation  farming lies in the field  of social policy. Absentee
ownership  has  traditionally  been  associated  with  lack  of  attention  to  the
amenities  of life  in rural  areas  and with  an  inadequate  rural social  infra-
structure.  It  is  not clear  that  a  rural  structure  dominated  by  corporation
farms  must  inevitably  lead  to  a  deterioration  in  the  social  quality  of  the
rural  environment.  If  corporate  ownership  is  absentee,  if  profits  are  not
reinvested  in  the  community,  if  management  success  is  judged  solely  in
terms  of  corporate  profits,  then  the  corporation  farm  may  pose  a  social
threat  to  the  rural  community.  This  is  not  necessarily  a  condemnation
of  all types  of  corporation  farming.  If  the  corporation  is  predominantly
a  family  affair,  and  its  officers  and  stockholders  reside  in  the community,
there  is no clear  reason why  this form  of farm busines organization  should
pose  a  social  threat  to rural  life.
The  least  desirable  situation  may  be  one  in  which  farm  corporations
are  larger  than  family-size  and  are  absentee-owned,  but  not  national  in
scope  or  scale  of  operation.  This  could  lead  to  a  type  of  "petty  cor-
poratism,"  comparable  with  the  petty  landlordism  that  has  been  the
curse  of slum  areas  in urban  centers.  It is  quite  possible  to  have  farming
corporations  that  are  too  small,  as  well  as  to  have  individually  owned
farms  that  are too  small.
A  POLICY  POSTURE  TOWARD  CORPORATIONS  IN  FARMING
Much  of  the  recent  debate  over  corporation  farms  has  centered  on
proposals  to  outlaw  them.  Outright  statutory  prohibition  has  been  pro-
posed  and  now  exists  in  a  few  states.  Alternatively,  attempts  have  been
made  to  distinguish  between  "good"  or  family-type  corporate  farms,  and
"bad"  types,  in  which  the  stock  is  owned  predominantly  by  nonfarm
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not  achieve  the  goals  that  are  uppermost  in the minds  of  those  who  urge
this  solution.
The  alternative  approach  that  seems  most  defensible  is  to  insure  that
corporations  in  farming  are  not  given  intended  or unintended  advantages
in  the  competition  among  sizes  and  types  of  farms  that  is  now  acute  in
American  agriculture.  Occasionally  by  design  but  largely  by  accident,
our  institutional  structure  now  offers  advantages  for  large  and  corporate
farms.  If  competition  among  firms  is  to  result  in  an  economically  and
socially  desirable  structure  of  agriculture,  the  rules  of  the  game  must
be  fair.  Insuring  fairness  in  this  sense  is  a  highly  subjective  undertaking,
but it is  the  overriding  goal of  public  policy.  The  steps  that  can  be  taken
in  pursuit  of  this  goal  include:
1.  A  reform in  tax  laws  and practices  to  remove  existing  and  largely
unintended  advantages  for  the  large  or  corporate  farm.
2.  Modernization  and  revitalization  of  agricultural  cooperatives  to
provide  much  more  managerial  assistance  to  farmer  members.
3.  The  strengthening  of  research  and  extension  programs  to  focus
more sharply  on  insuring the  availability  of  agricultural  technology
and  management  services  to  medium-sized  farms  capable  of
achieving  gross  sales  of  $20,000  to  $100,000  annually.
4.  The  expansion  of  environmental  protection,  waste  disposal,  and
pollution  control  programs  to  include  the  whole  of  agriculture.
5.  The  active  extension  of  labor  and  welfare  legislation  to  cover  the
entire  farm  labor  force.
From  both  economic  and  social  points  of  view,  the  last  two  points
are the most  important.  We  have  ample  evidence  that  waste  disposal  and
pollution  control  costs  are  high  for  large-scale,  concentrated  agricultural
firms.  A  high  priority  in  public  policy  should  be  given  to  the  extension
to  agriculture  of  the  full  range  of  pollution  control  and  environmental
protective  measures.  If  family-type  farmers  oppose  this  extension,  they
will  make  a  major  contribution  to  their  own  destruction.
This  argument  applies  with  even  greater  force  to  labor  and  welfare
legislation.  Over time, the extension of labor legislation to cover  agriculture
is  virtually  inevitable.  We  will  experience  one  of  the  most  inexcusable
sequences  of  events  in  American  agriculture  if we  shift  to  large-scale  or
corporate units of production,  generated  in part by the incomplete coverage
of  farm  labor  under  collective  bargaining  laws,  only  to  find  that  the
resulting  large  units  are  peculiarly  vulnerable  to  labor  problems  and high
and  rigid wage  structures.  To  insure  constructive  competition  among large
farms,  corporate  farms,  and  family-type  farms,  it  is  essential  that  all  of
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taken  into  account.  One  of  the  biggest  unknowns  concerns  the  probable
pattern  of future  wage  costs  and labor  relations.  The  time  to  subject  this
to test  is now,  while the structure  of  American  agriculture  is  still  relatively
flexible.  To  refuse  to  extend  labor  protective  legislation  to  agriculture
is one of the most irrational agricultural  economic  policy decisions possible.
The  refusal  does  nobody  good,  and  the  family-type  farmer  seems  likely
to suffer the  worst  injury.
To  accomplish  these  needed  policy  changes,  a  change  of  attitude  is
needed.  It  will  be  ironic  if  American  agriculture  evolves  a  corporate-
industrial  structure  exactly  out  of  phase,  at  a  time  when  that  structure
is  under  increasing  attack  in  the  nonagricultural  world.  The  key  issue
is  the  devolution  and  decentralization  of  power-economic,  social,  and
political.  We have  a  relatively  decentralized  power  structure  in American
agriculture.  The majority  of  the  men  and women  in the  farm  labor  force
can  still  legitimately  feel  they  participate  in  decisions  and processes  that
shape  their  lives.  This  sense  of  participation  is  being  eroded  away,  but
it  still  has  vitality.  The  corporate  form  of  organization  can  accelerate
this  erosion,  or it  can  regenerate  a  sense  of  effective  and  rewarding  par-
ticipation  in productive  processes  and  in  community  life.
As  a  legal device,  the corporation  should  be  essentially  passive  in the
process  of  change  now  under  way  in  agriculture.  Whether  this  change
will  be  beneficial  or  harmful  depends  on  what  we  do  to  alter  the  other
dimensions  of  our  institutional  structure.  How  we  change  our  tax  laws,
whether  we  revitalize  our  cooperatives,  what  we  do  with  our  resources
of  agricultural  research  and  extension,  the  imagination  with  which  we
innovate  in  the  field  of  agricultural  credit,  and  how  quickly  we  extend
environmental  protection  and labor legislation to cover  all of  agriculture-
these  will  be  the  determinants  of  policy  toward  corporations  in  farming.
The most discouraging  aspect of much  of the response  to the expansion
of corporate farming,  large farms,  and vertical  integration  is the manifesta-
tion  of  "technological  determinism"  that  underlies  the  argument.  Tech-
nology  is  accorded  the  status  of  an  elemental  force-an  "act  of  God,"
in the  ancient  terminology  of  the courts.  It  is  not  analyzed  as  a  product
of  man or  as  capable  of  alteration  by  his  institutions.
We  need  to  recall  that not  all  growth  is  good,  and  not  all  change  is
progress.  And we  need,  above all,  to  recall  that  the  goal  of our  endeavor
is  not  the  production  of  goods,  but  the  development  of  human  beings.
The  ultimate  test  of  a  structure  of  agriculture,  or  of  any  sector  in  our
society,  is the  quality  of the  people  it produces.  This  is  the  goal  that  can
give  a  durable  and  defensible  order  to  our  priorities  in  shaping  policy
toward  corporations  in farming.
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